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8 March 1976

## NOTE FOR MR. LEHMAN

Dick:

As you know, I did not get a chance to complete a reading of the SSC draft on the role of the DCI this morning. But, I did scan the first 40 pages.

My main concerns were the following:

- On page 13 in a discussion of the difficulty of being both DCI and head of the Agency, no reference is made to the two-deputy concept now being adopted as a solution to this problem.
- In the discussion of intelligence production and departmental biases, nothing is said to indicate that honest people can have honest differences of views when evidence is not all that conclusive. (In short, differences of view are not always traceable to biases.)
- The Cambodian and SS-9 stories from pages 23-27 are very damaging indeed to Helms. My problem is that there is no testimony or quotation from Helms on the Cambodian incident. (He should have his say.)
- On page 8 the statement is made that the Nixon directive to the DCI of 1971 really didn't change things. My point is that things could have been made to be changed had the recipient used the directive differently.

Each of the above points was made orally to Lynn Davis. She seemed to accept each of them as legitimate and the implication was there would be some revisions.

Classified references to NSCID's, memoranda, and other assorted documentation are identified and interspersed through the text. From the technical standpoint someone needs to consider declassification. I saw nothing about which I would want to argue. The major exception to this

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would be the "close-to-the-bone" descriptions of satellite targetting and NSA monitoring on pages 35 and 36. Ditto the reference to NRO on page 40. (I gather from what you told me that Lynn agreed to finding different ways of describing all this.)

One small point lies in the second paragraph on page one which cites the DCI as responsible for coordinating intelligence. The fact goes back to the law in this report. My recollection of the law is that it is the CIA not the DCI who is so responsible.

As to points made that could generate eventual controversy and storm clouds, there are the following in varying areas of importance and severity:

- On page 6 it is said that the State Department and Defense have steadfastly opposed centralized management under the DCI. In the modern era, I don't think that this can be said of State.
- Pejorative language occurs in a few places. For example, on page 8 there is a reference to departmental efforts to "seize" responsibility for the production of intelligence. Later on, the NIO system is accused of having "undermined" the DCI by tasking departments to draft national production.
- The reference on page 12 to John Clarke's testimony about the Helms' rationale for staying in the SIGINT business is very frank indeed. It could be interpreted by CIA'ers as downgrading the importance of CIA SIGINT activities. Similarly, no one at NSA is apt to be very fond of the point.

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